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John M. Newman 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and adopted an “all-sums-with-
stacking” indemnity principle in the context of a large hazardous waste site cleanup.  The court 
employed this principle because of the plain language of the policies at issue, the expectations of parties 
to the insurance contracts, and because of the complexity of “long-tail” environmental injuries.  The 
court held the “all-sums” indemnity provisions applied to continuous injuries both beginning when 
coverage applied and continuing after policy expiration, as well as beginning prior to coverage but 
continuing into a new policy period.  Further, the court supported stacking of multiple insurers’ policies 
within any single policy period because doing so affords long-tail insureds increased protection through 
coverage they have already purchased.  The court deemed the adopted principle fair because insurers can 
expect to indemnify insureds while on the risk in a particular situation, and are free to include 
contractual terms avoiding all-sums coverage and prohibiting stacking.  Given similar factual 
circumstances and equivalent state insurance statutory schemes, the court’s reasoning in this case may 
prove relevant in jurisdictions other than California. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In State v. Continental Insurance Company,1 the California Supreme Court affirmed the court of 
appeal’s ruling regarding insurance coverage for the State’s liability at the Stringfellow Acid Pits waste 
depository.  In 1998, a federal court held the State responsible for the waste site and ordered cleanup.2  
The State sought indemnity from those insurers who provided coverage during the years in which the 
injury occurred.3  Reversing the trial court in part, the court of appeal held the injury was continuous 
                                                
1 281 P.3d 1000 (Cal. 2012). 
2 Continental Insurance, 281 P.3d at 1003-1004. 
3 Id. at 1004-1005. 
through each policy period within a stipulated range of dates.  The court also held policies from each 
insurer and each policy period could be stacked and exhausted to their respective limits.4  Affirming the 
court of appeal, the California Supreme Court held this “all-sums-with-stacking” indemnity principle 
best comported with the plain language of the policies at issue, the expectations of parties to the 
insurance contracts, and complex “long-tail” environmental injuries.5 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 This appeal arose out of the federal court-ordered remediation of California’s Stringfellow Acid 
Pits industrial waste site.6  The site, a rock quarry located in Riverside County, received more than 
30 million gallons of industrial waste between 1956 and 1972.7  However, the State of California 
erroneously deemed the quarry suitable for use as a depository: shallow groundwater and canyon-floor 
bedrock fractures permitted waste to escape and heavy rain events in 1969 and 1978 overburdened the 
concrete dam enclosing the site.8  In particular, the 1978 event compelled state officials to purposely 
release contaminants, resulting in a widespread waste plume.9 
 A federal court found the State negligent as to site choice and design in 1998 and held the State 
liable for all past and future cleanup costs associated with Stringfellow.10  Even before this finding, the 
State sought indemnity for its estimated $700 million liability from several of its insurers and filed suit 
in 1993 accordingly.11  Each of the insurers involved in the suit issued excess commercial general 
liability (“CGL”) policies to the State in the operative years between 1964 and 1976.12  Prior to and after 
                                                
4 Id. at 1005. 
5 Id. at 1009-1012. 
6 Id. at 1003-1004. 





12 Id. at 1003. 
these dates the site was uninsured.13  Of the terms of the various policies, the following language was 
virtually identical: 
Insurers agreed to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall 
become obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed by law . . . for 
damages . . . because of injury to or destruction of property, including loss of use 
thereof.14 
 
Further, the policies placed limits on liability relative to each occurrence, and defined “occurrence” as 
“an accident or continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in . . . damage to property 
during the policy period.”15 
 Following a 1999 bench ruling interpreting policy language and a 2002 ruling against holding the 
State liable for failing to mitigate the insurers’ damages, the State filed a second suit asserting similar 
claims against additional insurers.16  The 1993 and 2002 suits were consolidated and all defendant 
insurers agreed to the stipulation that the State’s – their insured’s – negligence occurred throughout 
multiple policy periods from 1964 to 1976.”17  The trial court held that each insurer was liable to the 
limits of their respective policies for the loss associated with the Stringfellow site in light of the policies’ 
all sums language.18  However, the court held that the State could not “stack” policies to recover either 
the limits of consecutive policies under any one insurer or the limits of all policies under all insurers 
from the chosen single policy period.19  Rather, the State had to choose a particular policy period from 
the years 1964 to 1976 and could only recover to the limits of a single policy in effect during that 
period.20 
 In May 2005, with the above policy language, mitigation, and liability rulings in place, a jury 
found the insurers had breached their respective policies, but that the State could recover no more than 
                                                
13 Continental Insurance, 281 P.3d at 1003. 
14 Id. at 1004 (internal quotations omitted). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 1004-1005. 
17 Id. at 1005. 
18 Continental Insurance, 281 P.3d at 1005. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
$48 million from all insurers combined.21  Because the State had settled with several defendant insurers 
for $120 million to-date, the jury refused to award the State monetarily despite the judgment in its 
favor.22  On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s “all sums” determination 
but reversed its anti-stacking ruling, holding that the State could recover the combined limits of all 
policies triggered and in-effect during the chosen policy period.23  The defendant insurers filed the 
instant appeal thereafter.24 
III.  HOLDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 A.  “All sums” insurance policy provisions. 
 The California Supreme Court began its analysis by discussing insurance policy interpretive 
norms, then defined the nature of, and complications associated with, long-tail injury insurance claims.25  
Long-tail injuries, the court explained, are typical of “environmental damage and toxic exposure 
litigation,” where claims are “characterized as a series of indivisible injuries attributable to continuing 
events without a single unambiguous ‘cause’.”26  Such injuries create escalating, compound damage, and 
are rarely adequately addressed in CGL policies.27  Because it is nearly impossible for an insured to 
determine the extent of long-tail damage attributable to particular policy periods, the issue of when “a 
continuous condition become[s] an ‘occurrence’ for the purposes of triggering insurance coverage” is 
critical to resolving insurer liability and insured exposure.28 
 The Court resolved this issue in the instant suit by applying its decisions in two prior cases 
involving an insurer’s duty to defend.29  In Montrose, the Court considered whether a single insurer 
                                                
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Continental Insurance, 281 P.3d at 1005. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1005-1007. 
26 Id. at 1006. 
27 Continental Insurance, 281 P.3d at 1006-1007. 
28 Id. at 1007. 
29 Id. at 1007-1008 (citing Montrose Chemical Corporation of California v. Admiral Insurance Company, 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 
1995); spaceAerojet-General Corporation v. Transport Indemnity Company, 948 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1997)). 
among seven, whose policy covered the last four years of a 26-year coverage period, had a duty to 
defend suits alleging injuries from chemicals manufactured by its insured before and continuing through 
the coverage period.30  Citing the relevant policy language, the Montrose Court held that ongoing 
circumstances trigger coverage as “occurrences” when “‘property damage’ results from a causative 
event consisting of ‘[an] accident or continuous and repeated exposure to conditions,’” so long as the 
damage occurs within the effective period of the triggered policy.31  Essentially, because property 
damage occurred during the policy period, the fact that the cause of the damage manifested before the 
insurer’s coverage began did not release the insurer from its duty to defend suits centered in that 
damage. 
 Conversely, in Aerojet, the Court considered whether an insurer was bound to defend claims 
arising after a policy expired when the cause of the injury began during the policy period.32  The Aerojet 
Court proceeded from the “settled rule” that insurers must indemnify their insureds for the entirety of 
any injury which begins during an active policy period.33  Further, the Aerojet court held that insurer’s 
on the risk in this manner were responsible for “all claims involving the triggering damage,” rejecting 
the notion that insureds could in any way be responsible for defending claims themselves.34  The instant 
Court concluded that “as long as the property is insured at some point during the continuous damage 
period, the insurers’ indemnity obligations persist until the loss is complete, or terminates.”35 
 Applying the Montrose and Aerojet holdings to the instant suit, the Court held each of the 
defendant insurers responsible for the continuous Stringfellow Acid Pits loss up to the limits of each of 
their consecutive policy periods.36  The Court noted the parties’ stipulation to the fact that damage 
                                                
30 Id. at 1007 (citing Montrose, 913 P.2d at 886-888). 
31 Id. at 1007-1008 (citing Montrose, 913 P.2d 886-888)(defining “property damage” as that which occurs during the policy 
period and “occurrence” as including repeated exposure leading to property damage)). 
32 Continental Insurance, 281 P.3d at 1008 (citing Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 929-931). 
33 Id. (citing Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 929-931). 
34 Id. (citing Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 929-931). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
occurred at Stringfellow while each was on the risk, as well as their admission that pinpointing the 
timing of the damage was impossible.37  Further, the Court specifically addressed three of defendants’ 
notable arguments.38  First, the Court refuted defendants’ contention that they were jointly and severally 
liable for the Stringfellow injuries, instead concluding that each defendant was “separately and 
independently obligated to indemnify the insured.”39  Second, the Court denied the merit of a pro rata 
allocation of defendants’ liability based on annual “shares” of the total loss multiplied by the respective 
number of years each individual insurer covered the insured.40  The Court found such a scheme 
antithetical to the global notion of coverage embodied in “all sums” policy language.41  Finally, the 
Court addressed defendants’ argument that the policy phrases “all sums” and “during the policy period” 
necessarily precluded their liability for damage incurred before or after the effective dates of their 
respective policies.42  The Court adopted the State’s response that the phrase “during the policy period” 
was outside of the Insuring Agreement section of the policy and did not operate upon the “all sums” 
provision.43  Ultimately, the Court held the insurers’ “coverage extends to the entirety of the . . . damage 
[at Stringfellow], and best reflects the insurers’ indemnity obligation . . . , the insured’s expectations, 
and the true character of the damages that flow from a long-tail injury.44 
 B.  “Stacking” multiple insurance policies. 
 The Court next considered the court of appeal’s decision to permit stacking of multiple policies 
on the Stringfellow loss over the course of the long-tail injury.45  The Court described stacking as 
aggregating “policy limits across multiple policy periods . . . on a particular risk . . . mean[ing] that 
when more than one policy is triggered by an occurrence, each policy can be called upon to respond to 
                                                
37 Continental Insurance, 281 P.3d at 1008. 
38 Id. at 1008-1010. 
39 Id. at 1008-1009 (citing Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 943 n. 10). 
40 Id. at 1009. 
41 Id. at 1009-1010. 
42 Continental Insurance, 281 P.3d at 1010. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1010-1012. 
the claim up to the full limits.”46  The instant court adopted the court of appeals’ all-sums-with-stacking 
indemnity principle as consistent with its own jurisprudence, as well as with the expectations of insureds 
who secured policies over multiple periods and rightly understood they were covered for each.47  
Importantly, the court noted that, absent language in a policy or a statute specifically prohibiting 
stacking, the practice is permitted in standard insurance policies.48  The court described the resource 
available to long-tail injury insureds via the all sums stacking principle as an “uber-policy” equivalent to 
purchasing all of the triggered policies in one policy period.49  Ultimately, the Court affirmed the court 
of appeal’s ruling on both the all-sums and stacking considerations. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 The California Supreme Court’s ruling in Continental Insurance represents a strong and positive 
reinforcement of the court’s environmental liability insurance jurisprudence.  The court’s holding 
relieves parties liable for long-tail environmental injuries by providing broad indemnity prospects in the 
face of substantial exposure.  The outcome should not offend insurers, who collected premiums and 
purposely assumed that exposure in a given policy period or series of policy periods: insurers on the risk 
can reasonably expect to indemnify insureds during periods of coverage.  The holding does hint at the 
court’s deference for policy language though, and suggests that insurers displeased with the “all-sums-
with-stacking” principle are free to attempt to contract around it.  Given similar factual circumstances 
and equivalent state insurance statutory schemes, the court’s reasoning in Continental Insurance may 
prove relevant in jurisdictions other than California. 
                                                
46 Id. at 1010-1011 (citation omitted). 
47 Continental Insurance, 281 P.3d at 1011-1012. 
48 Id. at 1011. 
49 Id. (citation omitted)(emphasis added). 
